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WHREN v. UNITED STATES: AN ABRUPT
END TO THE DEBATE OVER
PRETEXTUAL STOPS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Whren v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court held

that a traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment 2 if a
police officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation
has occurred, even if the stop is a pretext for the investigation of a
more serious offense. The Court affirmed the convictions of
Michael A. Whren and James L. Brown, who had been arrested on
federal drug charges after Washington, D.C., police stopped Brown
for minor traffic infractions. The Court's unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice Scalia, brought an end to a long-running debate over
the proper Fourth Amendment treatment of pretextual police conduct, and pretextual traffic stops in particular.3 The United States
Courts of Appeals, state appellate courts, and various commentators
were sharply divided over the question of whether pretextual stops

violate the Fourth Amendment and, if so, what the test for identifying such unconstitutional conduct should be. Whren, however, was

the first case in which the Supreme Court directly addressed the
issue.
1. 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
2. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. This Note uses the term "pretextual stop" to mean a traffic stop that occurs
when an officer has probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that a motorist has violated a traffic law, but which the officer would not have made absent a
desire, not supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion, to investigate a
more serious offense. A classic pretextual stop occurs when an officer stops a motorist who is driving one mile per hour over the speed limit with the real motivation
of investigating a hunch that the motorist is a drug dealer.
Pretextual police conduct can take other forms beside traffic stops; the most common of these is the use of outstanding arrest warrants for minor charges (traffic
offenses, failure to appear, nonsupport, etc.) as a pretext to investigate more serious
crimes. See, e.g., United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987) (failure-toappear warrant used as pretext to arrest robbery suspect); State v. Blair, 691 S.W.2d
259 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) (traffic warrant used as pretext to arrest murder suspect).
Most of what this Note says with regard to pretextual stops is applicable to these
situations, see United States v. Hudson, 100 F.3d 1409, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that Whren applies to pretextual arrests); but the problem of pretextual arrests is
perhaps less pressing for the simple reason that most people are not the subject of
outstanding arrest warrants, while most people do regularly violate the traffic laws.
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This Note will analyze the Whren decision as the last word in the
pretextual stop debate. Supreme Court search and seizure precedents and the holdings of lower courts on both sides of the issue will
be discussed by way of background, and then the Whren opinion
itself will be considered. This Note concludes that the holding of
Whren is correct both because it is dictated by precedent and because there are insurmountable logical and practical barriers to a
holding that pretextual stops violate the Fourth Amendment. Because only the Fourth Amendment issue was presented, however,
the Court did not examine the other factors that make pretextual
stops a real problem, and therefore failed to suggest any solutions.
This Note will therefore briefly examine possible alternative
solutions.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Supreme Court Precedents and the Problem of Pretextual
Stops
A person is subject to a "seizure" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment when his liberty is restrained by an officer of
the law by means of physical force or show of authority.4 A seizure
can take the form of a custodial arrest, a pedestrian "stop-andfrisk," or a traffic stop. The Fourth Amendment, applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that a seizure
in whatever form not be "unreasonable." 6 A traffic stop is normally
considered reasonable if the officer has either probable cause to believe that a violation of law has occurred, or a reasonable articulable
suspicion that a violation may be occurring.7 Outside a limited
number of exceptions-such as stops made at a roadblock---a stop
made without probable cause or reasonable suspicion is unreasonable, and any evidence obtained from the stop may not be used in
court.9
4. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
5. See id. at 16; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).

6. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985).
7. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422

U.S. 873, 880-81 (1975).
8. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (holding temporary drunk-driving roadblocks valid despite lack of particularized suspicion because
police discretion limited by regulations); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543 (1976) (holding permanent roadblocks for illegal aliens valid despite lack of particularized suspicion).

9. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule to states);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (evidence obtained in violation of
Fourth Amendment must be excluded from federal criminal trial). See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (excluding drug evidence seized after traffic stop
violating Fourth Amendment).
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The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that in determining
whether a police action is reasonable, it is inappropriate to examine
the officer's motivation. The clearest statement of this doctrine
came in the 1978 case of Scottv. United States.'0 The petitioner in
Scott was convicted on drug dealing charges based on evidence obtained in a telephone wiretap." He argued that the evidence should
have been suppressed because the federal agents conducting the
wiretap had acted with the intent to violate statutory requirements
that they minimize the number of calls intercepted. 2 In affirming
his conviction, the Court held that subjective intent cannot make
otherwise lawful conduct unconstitutional; 3 the proper inquiry
under the Fourth Amendment is "an objective assessment of an officer's1 4actions in light of the facts and circumstances then known to
him.'

Pretextual stops present a special problem, however, that the
Supreme Court had never directly addressed before Whren. By definition, the officer making the stop has probable cause or reasonable
suspicion that the motorist is violating a traffic law. At the same
time, though, the violation is a minor one which is normally not enforced. The most common examples are driving less than five miles
an hour over the speed limit, turning or changing lanes without signaling, and swerving slightly out of one's lane. On any given day,
one or more of these violations are surely committed by the majority of drivers on the road. Almost any driver, if observed over sufficient time, will be seen to commit a traffic infraction. If a traffic
stop-a seizure of the person, a physical restraint upon the liberty of
the citizen--can be justified by probable cause or reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation, the police have a tremendous amount of
discretion. They can stop any driver they like, for any reason they
like, if they can catch him breaking the most insignificant section of
the motor vehicle code. The real reason may be a mere hunch that
the driver is committing a more serious crime, or it may depend
upon "the price of our automobiles, the formality of our dress, the
shortness of our hair or the color of our skin."' 5 Even when not
based upon discriminatory criteria, pretextual stops seem to allow
police an easy way to lower the barriers the Supreme Court has erected against unfettered police discretion. This produces an instinctive reaction on the part of most observers that, in some way that
10. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
11. See id.
at 131-34.
12. See id. at 135.
13. See id. at 136-37.
14. Id. at 137.
15. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectiveson the FourthAmendment, 58 MINN. L.
RFv. 349, 416 (1974). This classic article, containing the text of the 1974 Oliver
Wendell Holmes Lectures, is cited in many cases and practically all law review articles dealing with the pretext issue.
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eludes easy definition, pretextual stops are a problem. For many
judges, law professors, and defense lawyers, this instinctive reaction
coalesced into a belief that pretextual stops violate the Fourth
Amendment.
B.

The "Would Have" Test

Appellate courts thus began, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, to
develop a test to discover when the justification offered for a stop is
a pretext. Initially, some courts simply inquired into the officer's
motivation: if his real reason for making the stop was a desire to
investigate a hunch or harass a racial minority, rather than a desire
to enforce the traffic laws, the stop was invalid and the evidence
(drugs, weapons, stolen goods, etc.) must be suppressed. Thus the
stop assertedly made for driving one mile per hour over the speed
limit is invalid because the officer's true motivation, a hunch that the
driver is a drug dealer, is not supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Such a test was used for a time by the United
States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. 6 Apart
from the practical difficulties of discovering subjective motivation,17
however, this line of thinking ran squarely into the Supreme Court's
directive, in Scott and elsewhere, that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry cannot be a subjective one.
To address the pretext problem in a more objective way, a new
test was developed, most often called the "would have" test." The
question under this test is "whether under the same circumstances a
reasonable officer would have made the stop in the absence of the
invalid purpose."19 According to its proponents, "[tihis test prop16. See, eg., United States v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding drug
arrest valid because arrest was not motivated by DEA agents' desire to search defendant); United States v. Cruz, 581 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (holding
traffic stop invalid despite officer's observation of illegal U-turn, because officer's
real motivation was to investigate hunch defendants were transporting illegal aliens).
The former Fifth Circuit's concern with pretext carried over after its 1981 division to
the new Eleventh Circuit, but not to the new Fifth Circuit. See infra notes 22 and 31.
17. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968) (White, J., dissenting) ("[S]ending state and federal courts on an expedition into the minds of
police officers would produce a grave and fruitless misallocation of judicial resources."); Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 436 ("[S]urely the catch is not worth the
trouble of the hunt when courts set out to bag the secret motivations of policemen
18. The "would have" test is also known as the reasonable officer test, police
practices test, the usual police activities test, or the modified objective test.
19. United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting
United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709 (11th Cir. 1986)). Smith was apparently
the first case to formulate the test in these terms, but it was not a pretextual stop
case in the sense that term is used in this Note. The Smith court found that the
officer did not have probable cause to make a traffic stop, and that the alleged traffic
violation had not occurred but was merely a post-hoc justification invented by the
prosecutor. See United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d at 709. For the distinction between
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erly preserves the Supreme Court's requirement of an objective inquiry into Fourth Amendment activity and Provides meaningful
judicial review of discretionary police action., 0 In theory, the inquiry under the "would have" test focuses not on the officer's motivation in making the stop, but on whether his action deviated from

standard police practice.2 ' The stop assertedly made for driving one
mile per hour over the speed limit is thus invalid not because of the

officer's ulterior motive, but because the stop deviates from standard practice in that a reasonable officer would not have made the

stop absent the ulterior motive.
The "would have" test was adopted by the Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits, and by a number of state appellate courts.2 The
Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, adopted
the test in the 1993 case of State v. Izzo.23 In Izzo, a late-night traffic stop in Pittsfield for a broken taillight and an inoperable plate
light led to a drug-trafficking arrest.24 In reviewing the superior
court's denial of Izzo's motion to suppress, the Law Court adopted
the "would have" test, but rejected the defendant's argument that

the stop was pretextual.25 The officer testified that, consistent with
his own standard practice, he would have stopped the car regardless

of any ulterior motive. 26 The stop was therefore held to be the ac-

tion of a reasonable officer.27
In Maine, the "would have" test first resulted in the suppression
of evidence in State v. Haskell, s in which a stop for driving four
miles per hour over the speed limit, made by an East Millinocket
officer at 1:20 a.m. "when the nearby bars were closing," was found

this type of "fabrication pretext" and pretext as used in this Note ("legal pretext"),
see infra notes 130-132 and accompanying text.
20. United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1517 (citations omitted).
21. The focus becomes sharper when standard practice can be measured against a
set of regulations promulgated by the law enforcement agency, describing under
what circumstances and by which officers minor traffic laws should be enforced.
Some commentators have urged that courts require conformity with such regulations as an element of a reasonable stop. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND
SEIzuE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.4(e), at 124-25 (3d ed.
1996); Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 416-28.
22. See, eg., United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472 (9th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Valdez, 931 F.2d 1448 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512
(10th Cir. 1988). For a list of state courts adopting the "would have" test, see the
amicus curiae brief filed in Whren by the California District Attorneys Association
(CDAA). Brief of CDAA, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 26-27,
Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No. 95-5841).
23. 623 A.2d 1277 (Me. 1993).
24. See id. at 1278-79.
25. See &L at 1280-81. The only authority cited by the court to support the
"would have" test was a previous edition of LAFAVE, supra note 21.
26. See State v. Izzo, 623 A.2d at 1280.
27. See id. at 1281.
28. 645 A.2d 619 (Me. 1994).
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to be a pretextual "fishing expedition" for OUI offenders. 9 The
court rejected the officer's testimony that it was his standard practice to stop drivers at night for any traffic violation, no matter how
minor, and held that a reasonable officer would not have made such
30
a stop absent the invalid purpose of "fishing" for drunk drivers.
C. The "Could Have" Test
While a number of courts adopted the "would have" test, most
courts considering the issue-including the majority of the United
States Courts of Appeals-rejected it.31 These courts simply refused to participate in the pretext hunt at all, and instead used what
is known as the "could have" test.3 2 Under this test, a stop is valid
"so long as a reasonable police officer could have made the stop." 33
The only question under this inquiry is whether, based on the facts
and circumstances known to the officer, there was probable cause or
reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred. 4 Courts
adopting the "could have" test generally reasoned that the "would
have" test is not really objective and thus is both contrary to the
Supreme Court's precedents and difficult (or impossible) to apply.35
Certainly a court's job is substantially easier if the only relevant
question at the suppression hearing is whether the defendant really
was driving fifty-six miles per hour in a fifty-five zone, rather than
whether a reasonable officer would have stopped him for doing so.
Among the courts using this approach was the D.C. Circuit. In
United States v. Mitchell,36 that court rejected a challenge to a
pretextual stop for driving at an unspecified "high rate of speed"
and turning without signaling that resulted in an arrest and conviction on federal drug charges.37 That the officer-who was bravely
29. Id. at 620-21.

30. See id. at 621-22.
31. See, eg., United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 1995) cert denied, 116
S. Ct. 2528 (1996); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 115 S.
Ct. 207 (1994); United States v. Jeffus, 22 F.3d 554 (4th ir. 1994); United States v.
Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 1993), cerL denied, 115 S.Ct. 297 (1994); United States

v. Meyers, 990 F.2d 1083 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Thgg, 925 F.2d 1064 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 962 (1991); United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th

Cir. 1987) (en banc). For the Tenth and D.C Circuits, see infra notes 36-45 and
accompanying text. The First Circuit never directly addressed the issue.
32. The "could have" test is also called the authorization test or the purely objective test.
33. United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d at 246.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 1993) ("The
standard relies solely on the objective facts and circumstances surrounding the

stop.").
35. See, eg., United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d at 247 (stating that the "would
have" test "requires a reviewing court to examine the motivations and hopes of a

police officer").
36. 951 F.2d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
37. See id. at 1293-94.
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patrolling Northeast D.C. on a motor scooter 3 8-witnessed a traffic

violation was enough to support a finding that "the objective circumstances clearly justified stopping the car."3 9 Without explicitly
speaking of the "would have" or "could have" tests, the court endorsed the basic principle of the latter: that an "otherwise valid stop
does not become unreasonable merely because the officer has intui-

tive suspicions that the occupants
of the car are engaged in some
40
sort of criminal activity."

Perhaps the most significant pre-Whren pretext decision was
handed down in December 1995 when the Tenth Circuit reversed its
earlier position and adopted the "could have" test. In United States

v. Botero-Ospina,4 1 a Utah sheriffs deputy stopped the defendant
and arrested him on drug charges, after seeing him straddling lanes

on an interstate highway.4' The court rejected the defendant's claim
of pretext, holding that the stop was justified both by probable
cause-because Utah law prohibits lane-straddling-and by a reasonable articulable suspicion that the defendant was driving under
the influence.43 In doing so, the court overruled United States v.
Guzman, the 1988 case in which it had originally adopted the
"would have" test.44 The court's reasons for the reversal were that
the "would have" test is unworkable (for which the court cited its

own inconsistent application of the standard), that it is contrary to
the Supreme Court's insistence on an objective inquiry, and that it
usurps the legislative task "of determining what the traffic laws
ought to be, and how those laws ought to be enforced."4 This deci-

sion may have marked a trend, 46 but until Whren the Supreme
Court had not spoken directly on the issue, and indeed had refused
to do so on a number of occasions.4 7

38. See id. at 1293.
39. Id. at 1295.
40. I& (quoting United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 501 (8th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 962 (1991)).
41. 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
42. See id. at 785.
43. See id. at 788.
44. 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988).
45. United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 787-88.
46. See, eg., State v. Mease, 842 S.W.2d 98 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) (holding arrest
of murderer on nonsupport warrant valid despite pretextual motive), rev'g State v.
Blair, 691 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) (holding arrest on outstanding parking
violation warrant an invalid pretext where real motive was desire to investigate murder, and suppressing defendant's confession).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
115 S.Ct. 97 (1994); United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726 (4th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S.Ct. 1374 (1994); United States v. Mans, 999 F.2d 966 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 999 (1993); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 508 U.S. 944 (1993); United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 962 (1991); United States v. Hope, 906 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied,499 U.S. 983 (1991); Limonja v. Commonwealth, 383 S.E.2d 476 (Va. Ct.
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A

WHREN V. UNITED STA TES

Facts and ProceduralHistory

On June 10, 1993, Officers Efrain Soto, Jr., and Homer Littlejohn
of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department were
patrolling for drug activity in Southeast D.C. in an unmarked car
driven by Investigator Tony Howard. 48 The officers, who were in
plain clothes, became suspicious as they passed a Nissan Pathfinder
at a stop sign.4 9 There were two young black men in the vehicle,
which had temporary license plates ° The truck was stopped at the
intersection for more than twenty seconds, and one of the officers
saw the driver, James Lester Brown, looking down into the lap of
the passenger, Michael A. Whren. 1 As Howard made a U-turn to
follow the truck, it made a right turn without signaling and sped off
at an "unreasonable speed.152 Howard caught up with the truck at a
red light, with cars in front, behind, and to the right of it. Howard
pulled up on the car's left, into the lane of oncoming traffic, to box it
in.53 Officer Soto jumped out, followed by Officer Littlejohn, identified himself as a police officer, and ordered Brown to put the Pathfinder in park.' Whren, who had been holding two clear plastic
bags containing crack cocaine, attempted to stuff one of these bags
into a hidden compartment in the passenger-side door. s Soto
opened the driver's side door, dove across Brown and, while Little56
john restrained Brown, grabbed the other bag from Whren.
Whren and Brown were arrested s7 A search of the Pathfinder
made on the scene disclosed a small quantity of marijuana laced
with PCP in addition to the two bags of crack cocaine.5
App. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 905 (1990); United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210
(3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 833 (1987). See also State v. Blair, 691 S.W.2d 259
(Mo. 1985) (en banc), cert. granted, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986), and cert. dismissed as inprovidently granted, 480 U.S. 698 (1987).

48. See United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
49. See id

50. See id.
51. See id.
52. Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996). Note the interesting
coincidence that the defendant in Mitchell was also stopped for driving at a "high
rate of speed" and turning without signaling. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text. After the result in that case, the D.C. police may have realized the value of
using these traffic infractions as a drug enforcement tool. See United States v.
Whren, 53 F.3d at 375 ("Mitchell provides strikingly similar facts to this case.").
53. See United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d at 372.
54. See id. at 372-73.
55. See id. at 373.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
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Whren and Brown were indicted on four counts by a federal

grand jury.5 9 They moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the

stop was pretextual and therefore unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.60 At the suppression hearing, Officer Soto testified
that the stop was made because he wanted to ask Brown why he had
stopped for so long at the stop sign, which Soto believed was a "failure to pay 'full time and attention"' to his driving in violation of the
traffic code. 6 Soto also testified that Brown had committed the ad-

ditional offenses of turning without signaling and driving at an unreasonable speed.62 Soto denied that the defendants' race had
anything to do with the decision to stop the Pathfinder.6' The defense claimed that these violations were fabricated by Soto, pointing
to several discrepancies in the testimony of Soto and Littlejohn.' 4
The defendants argued that, even if the violations had occurred, the
stop was pretextual because, as Soto testified, he was a drug investigator who seldom made traffic stops, and he had no intention of
issuing a ticket to Brown.6 5 The district court' denied the suppression motion, finding that "the facts of the stop were not controverted. There was nothing to really demonstrate that the actions of
the officers were contrary to a normal traffic stop."'67 The defendants were convicted 68by a jury on all counts and sentenced to fourteen years inprison.
A panel of the D.C. Circuit affirmed the convictions. 69 Relying
on its Mitchell opinion, the court70 found the stop was justified because Soto had probable cause to believe Brown had committed a
traffic violation.7 The court explicitly adopted the "could have"
test and rejected the "would have" test in a way that it had not in
Mitchell.72 Two reasons were given for choosing the "could have"
test: it avoids an inquiry into the officer's subjective state of mind,
59. See id. at 372.
60. See id. at 373.
61. ld.
62. Petitioners' Brief at 5-6, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No.
95-5841).
63. See United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d at 373.
64. See Petitioners' Brief at 9.
65. See id at 6.
66. Norma Holloway Johnson, District Judge. See id. at 3.
67. United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d at 373 (quoting unreported suppression decision below).
68. See id.
69. See id. at 376.
70. Sentelle, Circuit Judge, writing for a panel also including Circuit Judges
Buckley and Williams. See id.at 372.
71. See id. at 376.
72. See id.at 375. "[R]egardless of whether a police officer subjectively believes
that the occupants of an automobile may be engaging in some other illegal behavior,
a traffic stop is permissible as long as a reasonable officer in the same circumstances
could have stopped the car ...."Id.
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and the requirement of probable cause or reasonable suspicion provides enough restraint to satisfy "appellants' legitimate concerns regarding police conduct."73 The court also made clear that it did not
matter that the officers making the stop were plainclothes vicesquad investigators rather than uniformed traffic patrolmen:
"[W]hether a stop can be made depends on whether the officers had
an objective legal basis for it, not on whether the police department
assigned the officer in question the duty of making the stop."7' 4 Motions for rehearing and rehearing en banc were denied, 75 and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.7 6

B. Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners Whren and Brown made a number of arguments in
support of their contention that the Court should adopt the "would
have" test.77 First, they argued that that test is consistent with the
Court's concern, expressed in numerous previous cases, with the
73. Id. at 375-76.
74. Id. at 376.
75. See id. at 371.
76. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 690 (1996). Speculation on why the
Court finally granted certiorari in a pretext case after denying it so many times previously would be idle, but it might plausibly be argued that Whren was a perfect test
case. Whren involved a stop by drug investigators who obviously had no concern
with enforcing the traffic laws, in contrast to the stops by state troopers or highway
patrolmen that seem to make up the majority of pretext cases. Despite lame argument to the contrary by the government, there was no credible reason to believe that
the stop was not exactly what Whren and Brown alleged, a pretext to allow the
officers to investigate a hunch that the defendants were drug dealers. In addition,
despite the defendants' attempt to elicit a contrary statement by Officer Soto in
cross-examination at the suppression hearing, there was no evidence that the stop
was racially motivated. Fmally, although the defendants suggested that Soto had
fabricated the traffic violations, see Petitioners' Brief at 2-9, Whren v. United States,
116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No. 95-5841), they apparently made no attempt on appeal to
challenge the district court's finding of probable cause. United States v. Whren, 53
F.3d at 374, 376. These factors combined to present an ideal test case for pretextual
stops.
77. See Petitioners' Brief at 15-49. Their preferred version of the test states that
stops are unreasonable "if they deviate so far from standard police practices that a
reasonable officer in the same circumstances would not have made the intrusion on
the basis asserted." Id. at 31.
Amicus curiae briefs in support of the petitioners were filed by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL), Brief of Amicus Curiae NACDL in
Support of Petitioners, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No. 95-5841)
and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU in
Support of Petitioners, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No. 95-5841).
The NACDL argued chiefly that the "would have" test is an objective "totality of
circumstances" standard that is consistent with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See
NACDL Brief at 3-6. The ACLU argued that the proper standard is to invalidate a
pretextual stop if it was made in violation of police regulations, or if a reasonable
officer would not have made the stop, or if the officer's subjective motivation was
improper. See ACLU Brief at 15-20.
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danger posed by arbitrary police actions.7" The danger is especially
acute, they claimed, where the breadth of traffic regulations has
given police essentially unfettered discretion to stop motorists and
where that discretion is often used to discriminate against racial minorities.79 Second, they argued that the "would have" test is "purely
objective" and thus is consistent with the Court's insistence on an

objective inquiry into Fourth Amendment reasonableness.8 0 The

"reasonable officer would have" standard, they claimed, is essen-

tially the same as the test set forth in Terry v. Ohio: "would the facts
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search

'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action
taken was appropriate?"'" Third, they argued that the stop of
Whren and Brown clearly violated the "would have" test because it

was made in violation of D.C. Metropolitan Police Department regulations prohibiting plainclothes officers in unmarked cars from en-

forcing traffic laws unless the violation is "so grave as to pose an

immediate threat to the safety of others." 82 To support this argu-

ment they cited Supreme Court cases holding conformity with regulations to be a necessary part of a reasonable search or seizure in
some circumstances.83 They also claimed that under the balancing

test required by the Fourth Amendment, an individual's interest in
not being seized by plainclothes officers in unmarked cars outweighs
the government's interest in using such officers to enforce the traffic
laws. 84
The government responded by arguing, in similar terms to the
Tenth Circuit in Botero-Ospina, that the "would have" test is unworkable, necessarily subjective in practice, and inconsistent with

the Court's precedents.8 5 It argued that the proper remedy for the

78. See Petitioners' Brief at 16-18.
79. See id. at 18-26.
80. See id. at 30-32.
81. l at 36 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)).
82. Id. at 41 (quoting Metropolitan Police Department General Order
303.1(1)(A)(2)(a)(4) (1992)). See infra note 154 for the full text of this order.
83. See id at 36. The cases cited included Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz,
496 U.S. 444, 452 (1990) (drunk-driving roadblock must follow standard procedure);
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (same); South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976) (inventory search must follow standard procedure).
84. See Petitioners' Brief at 37-49, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996)
(No. 95-5841).
85. See Respondent's Brief at 13-20, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769
(1996) (No. 95-5841). Amicus briefs in support of the respondent were filed by the
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation (CJLF), Brief Amicus Curiae of CJLF in Support
of Respondent, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No. 95-5841), the
California District Attorneys' Association (CDAA), Brief of CDAA, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No.
95-5841), and the State of California (on behalf of 13 other amici states), Brief of the
State of California, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Whren v.
United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No. 95-5841). Their arguments essentially
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problem of pretextual stops, if there is a problem, is recourse to the
legislative bodies whose traffic laws have given the police so much
discretion, or resort to the Equal Protection Clause for racially motivated stops.' In fact, the government argued pretextual stops are
often good, because considering other objectives in deciding how
and when to enforce the traffic laws is an efficient use of law enforcement resources.' As for the regulations on which the petitioners placed so much reliance, the government argued that they are
constitutionally irrelevant as long as the officer's conduct is justified
by probable cause or reasonable suspicion.as
C. The Supreme Court's Decision
In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment of the D.C. Circuit.89 First, the Court
made it clear that the precedents were entirely against the petitioners' view of pretextual conduct. 90 The petitioners cited three cases
for the proposition that an improper investigatory motive can make
otherwise valid police conduct unreasonable, but the Court pointed
out that these cases all involved inventory or administrative searches
made in the absence of probable cause, which are valid only if made
for the purposes justifying the exceptions.91 The petitioners also
cited dicta in a case with similar facts, Colorado v. Bannister,9 suggesting that the justification offered for the stop was acceptable because it was not a pretext. 3 This, the Court said, was perhaps a
recognition that no pretext issue was raised, but it simply may have
meant that the justification had not been fabricated. 94 More important, any weak support petitioners may have derived from these
cases was more than canceled out by holdings directly contrary to
mirrored those of the government. The one addition was an argument by the CJLF
that even if pretextual stops are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, they
should not be subject to the exclusionary rule because, being the rare acts of "rogue
officers," they are not deterrable. See CJLF Brief at 19-20.
86. See Respondent's Brief at 28-29.

87. See id. at 23-25.
88. See id. at 22-24.
89. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1771, 1777 (1996).
90. See id. at 1773-74.
91. See id. at 1773. The three cases cited were Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990)
(stating inventory search must not be ruse to search for evidence); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (holding inventory search valid where police followed stan-

dard procedure and had no investigatory purpose); and New York v. Burger, 482
U.S. 691 (1987) (holding administrative search valid where not a pretext for criminal
investigation).
92. 449 U.S. 1 (1980) (per curiam) (involving traffic stop for speeding made when
officer may have been motivated by desire to investigate robbery).
93. See id. at 4 n.4.
94. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. at 1773. See infra note 131 and accompanying text, regarding such "fabrication pretexts."
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their arguments.95 These included United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,9 6 in which a valid boarding of a sailboat to check documentation by Customs Service officers was not rendered invalid by the fact
that they had received a marijuana-smuggling tip and were accompanied for that reason by a state trooper; United States v. Robinson,9 7 in which a traffic arrest was held proper although it may have
been a pretext for a search, and a search incident to arrest, a type of
search the Court had previously justified only because of officersafety concerns, was held proper even though the officer had no fear
for his safety; and Scott v. United States.9" The Court also dismissed
the petitioners' concerns about racially motivated pretextual stops
by noting that "the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally
discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause,
not the Fourth Amendment." 99
Second, the Court rejected the petitioners' argument that the
"would have" test, especially if focused on police adherence to regulations and standard practices, is acceptable as an objective substitute for an improperly subjective pretext inquiry. 10 The "would
have" test, the Court said, though framed objectively, "is plainly and
indisputably driven by subjective considerations."''1 "Instead of
asking whether the individual officer had the proper state of mind,
the petitioners would have us ask, in effect, whether (based on general police practices) it is plausible to believe that the officer had the
proper state of mind."' 0 Such a test is incompatible with the precedents not just because of its evidentiary difficulties, but because the
teaching of the cases-"which applies equally to attempts to reach
subjective intent through ostensibly objective means-is simply that
the Fourth Amendment's concern with reasonableness allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent."'10 3 In addition, the Court held that reliance on police
practices is improper because such practices vary from place to
place in a way that the Fourth Amendment cannot. 1'4 Any sugges95. See id. at 1774.
96. 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
97. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). See also Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), the
companion case to Robinson, which was decided the same day with the same hold-

ing on similar facts. But see Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 416, for an argument that
the Court missed a great opportunity in failing to distinguish between the two cases:
the officer in Robinson was required by departmental policy to make an arrest,
rather than issue a summons, and to make a search incident to the arrest, while in
Gustafson these choices were completely within the officer's discretion.
98. 436 U.S. 128 (1978). See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
99. Whren v. United States, 116 S.Ct. at 1774.
100.
101.
102.
103.

See id. at 1774-76.
Id. at 1774.
Id.
Id. at 1775.

104. See id.
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tion in Abel v. United States'05 that pretextual conduct in violation
of standard procedures is unreasonable must
be rejected, the Court
10 6
said, as inconsistent with the later cases.

Fmally, the Court noted that while the balancing test urged by the
petitioners is always theoretically present in any Fourth Amendment inquiry, in practice the balance has almost always been tilted
conclusively in the government's favor by the presence of probable
cause. 10 7 The exceptional cases where more than probable cause
was required have involved extraordinary intrusions of a type decid-9
edly not present in this case, 10 8 such as seizure by deadly force,'0
search by physical invasion of the body," 0 or warrantless or unannounced entry into a home."' That police are granted great discretion by the multiplicity of traffic laws does not change the balance
which is normally met by probable cause; even if the Court could
decide that the laws are so expansive that more than probable cause
is required, "we do not know by what standard (or what right) we
would decide, as petitioners would have us do, which particular provisions are sufficiently important to merit enforcement."' 2
The Court therefore concluded, in affirming the convictions of
Whren and Brown, that "there is no realistic alternative to the traditional common-law
rule that probable cause justifies a search and
, 113
seizure.

IV.

DISCUSSION

A.

Precedents

The Supreme Court's decision in Whren was essentially correct
both because it was dictated by the precedents and because of the
inadequacies of the "would have" test. First, the Court's previous
cases required a purely objective test under which the officer's ac105. 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
106. See Whren v. United States, 116 S.Ct. at 1775. But see infra notes 130-32

and accompanying text, for Professor Butterfoss's view that Abel is actually consistent with later cases because it condemns "fabrication" rather than "legal" pretexts.

107. See id. at 1776.
108. See id.
at 1776-77.
109. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (holding that shooting fleeing
burglary suspect is unreasonable despite probable cause to support arrest).

110. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (finding involuntary surgery under
general anesthesia to recover bullet unreasonable despite probable cause and full
judicial hearing).
111. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995) (holding common-law "knock
and announce" normally necessary before entering home despite probable cause
and warrant); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (holding warrantless entry to
arrest drunk driver unreasonable, despite probable cause, absent exigent

circumstances).
112. Whren v. United States, 116 S.Ct. at 1777.
113. Id.
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tual motive is irrelevant. These cases included Scott, Robinson, and
Villamonte-Marquez, cited in the Whren opinion, and other cases as

well. In Maryland v. Macon,11 4 for example, the Court, quoting
Scott, dismissed the suggestion that an officer's subjective intention
to retrieve the money paid could transform a purchase of an ob-

scene magazine into an unreasonable warrantless seizure. 115 In

Graham v. Connor,"6 the Court held that whether an officer, the
defendant in a section 1983 action, 1 7 intended to harm the plaintiff
by use of excessive force was irrelevant to the question of whether

his actions were reasonable." 8 "An officer's evil intentions will not
make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable [action]; nor will an officer's good intentions make an objectively

unreasonable

[action]

constitutional. '" 119

Even

the

persistently liberal Justice Brennan, who dissented in many search
and seizure cases during his long tenure on the Court, never argued

that subjective intent is relevant to Fourth Amendment reasonableness; instead, he generally thought that the objective justification for
particular types of searches and seizures should be more stringent
than the Court required. 2 °
The only exceptions to the broad rule of objectivity are the inven-

tory and administrative search cases, on which the petitioners placed
great emphasis.' 2 ' As the Court pointed out, however, these cases
114. 472 U.S. 463 (1985).
115. See id. at 470-71. "Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred

'turns on an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting him at the time,' ... and not on the officer's actual state
of mind at the time the challenged action was taken." Id. (quoting Scott v. United
States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978)).
116. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (Ku Klux Klan Act) establishes civil liability for
violation of constitutional rights by agents of state or local government.
118. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 397.
119. Id.
120. See eg., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691,718 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that warrantless administrative searches should not be allowed when
business not closely regulated); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 473-75 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that warrantless seizure of evidence should not be
allowed when First Amendment values are implicated); United States v. VillamonteMarquez, 462 U.S. 579, 599 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that boarding
of vessels in coastal waters should not be allowed without probable cause or reasonable suspicion); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 574 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that checkpoint stops for illegal aliens should not be
allowed without particularized suspicion); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 25455 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that search incident to arrest should not

be allowed when arrest is on administrative warrant not supported by probable
cause; "It is the individual's interest in privacy which the Amendment protects, and

that would not appear to fluctuate with the 'intent' of the invading officers.").
121. See Petitioners' Brief at 30, 36, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769
(1996) (No. 95-5841) (citing Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990) (inventory search);

New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (administrative search); Colorado v. Ber-
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allowed for an exceptional inquiry into subjective intent only to assure that the exception to the general rule requiring probable cause
applies only to searches for the purpose of inventory or administrative regulation.'
The limited departure from objectivity is thus
necessary to prevent the exception from swallowing the rule.
Despite its consistently objective approach, in a number of cases
the Court seemed concerned about the problem presented by
pretextual conduct, although it never invalidated a search or seizure
on those grounds.' The most noteworthy, and most problematic,
of these cases is Abel v. United States.' The FBI, suspecting Rudoff Abel of being a Soviet spy but lacking probable cause to arrest
him for espionage, informed the INS that Abel was an illegal
alien.' INS agents, accompanied by FBI agents, arrested Abel on
a valid administrative deportation warrant, and the FBI agents
searched his hotel room, finding evidence that led to his conviction
for espionage."
In Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion, the
Court held the arrest and search to be constitutional, but noted several times that this holding rested on the good faith of the agents.1t 7
If the use of the administrative warrant had been pretextual, the
Court stated, this would have constituted "serious misconduct"
which would have rendered the search and seizure invalid; but the
record precluded a finding of pretext in this case. 1" This holding
seems odd, to say the least, both because the facts seem to leave
little doubt, as one of the dissenting opinions pointed out,12 that the
warrant was used as a pretext to search Abel's room, and because it
seems so inconsistent with the later cases.
A convincing explanation, however, is offered by Professor Edwin
Butterfoss.130 He suggests that the "pretexts" which the Court condemned in Abel and elsewhere were not "legal" pretexts (such as
pretextual stops as that term is used in this Note), but "fabrication"
pretexts. 31 That is, the conduct the Court disapproved occurs not
tine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (inventory search); and South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364 (1976) (first authorizing the inventory search exception)).

122. See Whren v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1773 (1996).
123. For the Court's discussion of some of these cases, cited by the petitioners,
see supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
124. 362 U.S. 217 (1960).

125. See ad at 221-22.
126. See i at 223-25.
127. See id. at 226, 230.

128. See id.
at 246-47 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
129. See id.
130. Edwin J. Butterfoss, Solving the Pretext Puzzle. The Importance of Ulterior
Motives and Fabricationsin the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment Pretext Doc-

trine, 79 Ky. LU. 1 (1990).
131. Butterfoss elaborates:
In a "legal" pretext [case], the government offers a justification that is not
the true reason for the police activity, but that, if the motivation of the
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when an officer makes an objectively justified seizure for a minor
offense with the purpose of investigating a more serious charge, but
rather when he fabricates the initial justification. 132 There is no
question, of course, that "fabrication" pretexts violate the Fourth
Amendment, because when they occur the initial stop or arrest is in
fact unsupported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion; but the
problem is essentially one of fact-finding, not of constitutional
law. 13 3 Thus the "serious misconduct," in Justice Frankfurter's eyes,

would have occurred if the agents had fabricated a suspicion that
Abel was an illegal alien in order to get an administrative warrant

which would justify a search, rather than if they had used an actual
suspicion to get an objectively justified warrant which would be exe-

cuted with the ulterior motive of making the search-because the
latter is exactly what they did.

The "fabrication" pretext/"legal" pretext distinction also seems to
explain other cryptic comments by the Court. Justice Scalia recognized this in Whren when he dismissed a footnote from Colorado v.
Bannister'" which indicated that the traffic stop involved was not a
pretext: "[I]f by 'pretext' the Court meant that the officer really had
not seen the car speeding, the statement would mean only that
35
there was no reason to doubt probable cause for the traffic stop.'
When the cases are viewed in the light of this distinction, the petitioners really did not have a leg to stand on in their argument that

precedent

supports
36

their claim

that pretextual

stops are

unconstitutional.

officer is not considered, legally justifies the activity. In a fabricated pretext [case], the government offers a justification that is not the true reason
for the police activity and, in fact, is legally insufficient because it is not
supported by the facts,
let at 5-6 (footnotes omitted).
132. See id.at 7.
133. For a recent example of a case involving an unconstitutional "fabrication"
pretext and the difficult fact-finding involved in discovering such a pretext, see
United States v. Pearl, 944 F. Supp. 51 (D. Me. 1996). A Kittery police officer arrested Pearl and a companion on federal drug charges after detaining them in a rest
area on Interstate 95. The justification offered for the stop was that the officer had
observed one of the men dumping a car ashtray on the ground, in violation of
Maine's littering statute. See id. at 52. Before Whren, the stop might have been
challenged as a "legal" pretext which would not pass the "would have" test; after
Whren, the issue did not even arise. Instead, Judge Carter ordered the evidence
suppressed because he found that the officer had not observed the littering, but had
fabricated his story after later seeing the ashes on the ground, in order to provide a
justification for the stop. See id. at 52-54.
134. 449 U.S. 1, 4 n.4 (1980) (per curiam) ("There was no evidence whatsoever
that the officer's presence to issue a traffic citation was a pretext to confirm any
other previous suspicion about the occupants.").
135. Whren v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1773 (1996).
136. In correctly sorting out the precedents relevant to the pretext question, the
Whren Court has also resolved the long-running debate on that issue between
Professors James Haddad and John Burkoff in favor of Haddad. See John M.
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B.

Flaws of the "Would Have" Test

The Court was correct in holding that the "would have" test is
unacceptable. First, as the Court correctly pointed out, the test is
"plainly and indisputably driven by subjective considerations." 37
The evil that the test is meant to ferret out is pretextual stops-the
enforcement of traffic laws with ulterior motives of investigating
other crimes. Thus no matter how objectively it is phrased, the
"would have" test's "whole purpose is to prevent the police from

doing under the guise of enforcing the traffic code what they would
like to do for different reasons. '138 The subjective nature of the
"would have" test is clearly shown from its usual formulation:
"whether under the same circumstances a reasonable officer would
have made the stop in the absence of the invalid purpose." 13 9 The

last phrase proves the defect of the test, because the whole point of
the Supreme Court's cases dictating an objective inquiry is that
there is no such thing as an "invalid purpose." An action can be
invalid, if it is not justified by the facts and circumstances known to
the actor, but a purpose cannot because purpose is irrelevant to

Fourth Amendment reasonableness. While the petitioners managed
to avoid the tell-tale words in their proposed version of the "would
Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine Returns After Never Leaving, 66 U. DET. L
REv. 363 (1989); John M. Burkoff, Rejoinder Truth, Justice, and the American
Way-or ProfessorHaddad's"Hard Choices," 18 U. MicH. J.L Rnront 695 (1985);
John M. Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You See It, Now You Don't, 17
U. Mtci-. J.L. REFOtM 523 (1984); John M. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 70 (1982); James B. Haddad, Pretextual Fourth Amendment Activity: Another Viewpoint, 18 U. Mici. J.L. Rrsomi 639 (1985); James B. Haddad, Well-DelineatedExceptions, Claims of Sham, and FourfoldProbableCause, 68 J. CrMu. L &
CR]mrNoLOGY 198 (1977). Burkoff argued that the Supreme Court had approved a
case-by-case subjective inquiry into pretextual motivation. Haddad argued that to
the extent the Court was concerned with pretextual conduct, it took that concern
into consideration in making "hard choices" of what objective criteria to require for
a certain type of search or seizure. While Haddad seemed correct overall, he was
unable to explain the occasional times, like Abel, when the Court seemed to look at
pretext on a case-by-case basis. Butterfoss's "legal"I"fabrication" distinction, however, reconciles Haddad's view to these cases. See Butterfoss, supra note 130, at 1415. The Butterfoss-Haddad synthesis has in turn been vindicated by Whren. See
Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. at 1773-74.
137. Whren v. United States, 116 S. CL at 1774. Even some of the "would have"
test's more perceptive advocates admit its subjective character, arguing that a subjective inquiry is necessary despite the contrary precedents. See Morgan Cloud,
Judges, "Testilying," and the Constitution, 69 S. CAi. L REv. 1341, 1384 (1996)
("[T]he 'would have' test.., despite Professor LaFave's claims to the contrary...
actually incorporates the officer's subjective purpose into the analysis."). See also
Brief of Amincus Curiae ACLU in Support of Petitioners at 17-20, Vhren v. United
States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No. 95-5841) (supporting subjective inquiry); supra
note 136 (citing John M. Burkoff articles).
138. Wlhren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. at 1774.
139. United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir. 1988) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709 (11th Cir. 1986)).
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have" test,"4 their argument is clearly that such "invalid purposes"
make a pretextual stop invalid: "If an officer wants to 'check out' a
motorist for some reason short of reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, he has a tremendous incentive to find a way to evade the bar the
141
Fourth Amendment would otherwise impose to stopping the car.,
This focus on what the officer "wants" is inconsistent with the petitioners' claim that they were proposing an objective test.
Another claim advanced by the petitioners was that the "would
have" test is objective and constitutionally acceptable because it is
essentially the same as the test for reasonable suspicion adopted by
the Court in Terry v. Ohio.'42 This purported similarity is apparently based on nothing more than the fact that the "would have"
test speaks of a "reasonable officer," while the Terry standard refers
to a "reasonable man."' 43 The difference between the two tests,
however, is fundamental. Terry asks whether the hypothetical reasonable man would agree that the facts and circumstances known to
the actual officer added up to probable cause or reasonable articulable suspicion. The "would have" test goes much further and asks
its hypothetical reasonable officer whether, assuming the existence
of probable cause or reasonable suspicion, he would have done what
the actual officer did. Since suppression motions are decided by the
judge, 144 the practical difference is that Terry asks His Honor, "does
this add up to probable cause or reasonable suspicion to you?" while
the "would have" test asks him, "would you have stopped this car?"
The former question is a variant of the traditional one which the
Fourth Amendment explicitly contemplates will be considered by
magistrates before issuing warrants; the latter asks the judge to play
a strange game of "you be the cop."
The nature of that game provides the next fundamental reason to
reject the "would have" test: its unworkabiity. This is only hinted
at briefly by the Court, in Justice Scalia's characteristically sarcastic
style: courts applying the "would have" test "would be reduced to
speculating about the hypothetical reaction of a hypothetical constable-an exercise that might be called virtual subjectivity."' 5 The
lower courts provide evidence of just how unworkable that exercise
140. See supra note 77.
141. Petitioners' Brief at 22, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No.
95-5841).
142. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). For the petitioners' argument on this point, see Petitioners' Reply Brief at 11-15, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No. 955841); see also Petitioners' Brief at 36.
143. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
144. This is in contrast to "reasonably prudent person" questions common in tort
law, to which the petitioners analogized the "reasonable officer" inquiry, but which
are normally decided by the jury. See Petitioners' Reply Brief at 13 (citing W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 175-76, 185
(5th ed. 1984)).
145. Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1775 (1996).

1997]

PRETEXTUAL STOPS

is. The Tenth Circuit, in abandoning the "would have" test after
seven years of use, admitted that it had been unable to apply the test
in a consistent manner. 146 The California District Attorneys' Association, in its amicus curiae brief in Whren in support of the government, devoted several pages to a study of the inconsistent way in
which state and federal courts have applied the "would have"
test. 4 7 The problem is that the "reasonable officer" is incapable of
definition; thus many courts simply perform a subjective inquiry despite their adoption of the purportedly objective "would have" test.
Among those that do examine standard police practices, there is no
agreement as to whether the relevant practices are those of the individual officer, or his unit, or his department, or all the officers in the
state.
The Maine Law Court has regrettably contributed to this inconsistency. In State v. Izzo,"s it held that the officer's actions were reasonable because they were consistent with his own practice of
stopping drivers with broken taillights. 4 9 In State v.Haskell,'50 on
the other hand, it held that the officer's actions were unreasonable
although they were consistent with his own practice of stopping
drivers late at night for every traffic violation he witnessed; the court
did not explain just what wider practices the officer had apparently
violated.' It is fair to assume that if appellate courts have applied
the "would have" test in this inconsistent way, trial courts (whose
suppression decisions are usually unreported) have done no better.
The petitioners' only response to this was to argue that "[tihere is no
reason to believe that, with proper guidance from this Court, lower
courts cannot consistently and objectively apply" the "would have"
test.' 52 They made no attempt to say what this guidance should consist of, other than repeating the "would have" test with which the
lower courts are already familiar, and they could point to no jurisdiction where the test has been applied consistently. Furthermore,
they could not explain how police officers can be fairly expected to
understand the test when appellate judges cannot.
The one way that the petitioners did attempt to distinguish their
proposed test from the "would have" test as usually applied was to
146. See United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783,786 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Time
has proven the Guzman ["would have"] standard unworkable. In our own circuit.
its application has been inconsistent and sporadic.").
147. See Brief of CDAA, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 6-14,
Whren v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (1996) (No. 95-5841).
148. 623 A.2d 1277 (Me. 1993).
149. See id. at 1280-81.
150. 645 A.2d 619 (Me. 1994).
151. See id. at 620-22.

152. Petitioners' Reply Brief at 18, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996)
(No. 95-5841).
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place a greater emphasis on requiring police to follow regulations.153
This argument was easy to make in this case because there was no
credible question that the officers were violating departmental regulations by stopping the Pathfinder in plainclothes, in an unmarked
car that was not equipped with a siren or emergency lights, for violations that posed no real threat to public safety.15 4 There are at least
two problems with this approach, however. First, as the Court
pointed out, the protections of the Fourth Amendment cannot be as
variable as the police regulations will inevitably be.' The implausibility of the petitioners' argument is clear when it is distilled to its
essence: that a stop that violated the Fourth Amendment in Washington, D.C., would have been acceptable grounds for sending them
each to a federal penitentiary for fourteen years if made in a city
whose regulations permitted plainclothes officers to make traffic
stops in unmarked cars. Second, if this argument were accepted by
the Court, every police department in the nation could adopt the
regulations of the latter city, and every claim of a pretextual stop
could soon be met by a citation to the regulations justifying it. This
would render the test useless and would erase any positive effect
that prior regulations might have had in limiting police discretion.
Another weakness of the petitioners' argument that the Court
barely touched on is the insistence on a balancing test. It is unclear
how exactly this fits into the "would have" test-they did not explain whether the court is supposed to do the balancing as a part of
determining what a reasonable officer would do, or as an additional
element of the inquiry. The Court correctly held that a balancing
test was inappropriate, because the only cases where probable cause
did not tilt the balance all the way to one side involved extraordinary police practices, and extremely important individual interests,
of a type not present here.' 56 In addition, the issue in these cases
was the manner of the search or seizure, rather than whether or not
a search or seizure was justified. In any event, even if a balancing
test were appropriate here, it would have weighed against the petitioners. The balance posed in this case is not, as the petitioners
claimed, between the government's interest in promoting traffic
safety by means of traffic stops by out-of-uniform officers in un153. See Petitioners' Brief at 30-31, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769
(1996) (No. 95-5841).
154. "Members who are not in uniform or are in unmarked vehicles may take
[traffic] enforcement action only in the case of a violation that is so grave as to pose
an immediate threat to the safety of others." Petitioners' Brief at Addendum 4a
(quoting Metropolitan Police Department General Order 303.1(A)(2)(a)(4) (1992)).
155. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1775 (1996) (citing Gustafson v.
Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 265 (1973); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 755-56

(1979)).
156. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. at 1776-77. For the relevant cases, see
supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text.
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marked cars and the individual's interest in being free from such
stops. 57 Instead, the real balance is between the government's interest in using the traffic laws to catch drug dealers like Whren and
Brown-as the petitioners themselves insisted, that and not traffic
safety was the purpose of the stop here-and the individual's interest in being free to violate minor traffic laws, as the petitioners were
doing, without being pulled over.
The "would have" test has some other fundamental flaws. First,
no proponent of the test seems to be able to explain exactly how a
pretextual stop violates the Fourth Amendment. If an officer makes
a traffic stop without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, it is
easy to say how he has violated the Fourth Amendment: he has
made a seizure which is unreasonable because it lacks the required
justification. But if he makes a stop with probable cause, for an infraction which is usually ignored, because he has a hunch that the
driver may be a drug dealer, the nature of the constitutional violation is elusive at best. Professor LaFave, oft-quoted author of the
leading Fourth Amendment treatise and a proponent of the "would
have" test, offers this explanation: "It is the fact of the departure
from the accepted way of handling such cases which makes the officer's conduct arbitrary, and it is the arbitrariness which in this context constitutes the Fourth Amendment violation."' I s LaFave
follows this quotation by citing a number of Supreme Court cases
condemning arbitrary police conduct,"5 9 thus completing the unstated syllogism: pretextual stops are arbitrary police actions, arbitrary police actions violate the Fourth Amendment, therefore
pretextual stops violate the Fourth Amendment. The problem with
this is that LaFave and the Court have very different definitions of
"arbitrary." For LaFave, a search or seizure is arbitrary when it departs from the norm; for the Court, however, as shown by the very
cases LaFave cites, a search or seizure is arbitrary when it is made
without the limit on police discretion provided by the requirement
of a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion. Viewed this
way, the syllogism collapses, because pretextual stops, being by definition supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion, are necessarily excluded from the Court's definition of arbitrary conduct.
At least LaFave attempts a definition of "arbitrary," albeit a novel
one; most proponents of the "would have" test simply use the word

157. See Petitioners' Brief at 30-49.
158. 1 LAFAvE, supra note 21, § 1A(e), at 120-21.
159. See id. at 122-23 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967);
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873 (1975); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)).
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as a talisman,
throwing it around whenever their arguments seem
160
weak.

Furthermore, it is hard to understand why pretextual stops are
necessarily wrong, in the sense of being immoral or socially undesirable. To some degree, at least, it would seem that the contrary is
true. If everyone violates the traffic laws, and full enforcement is

impossible, it seems perfectly reasonable that traffic enforcement
priorities should be influenced by more important objectives like
catching drunk drivers or drug dealers. If an officer sees a driver
committing a minor traffic violation and has a hunch that the driver

is involved in a more serious crime, it seems a socially desirable and
efficient use of limited law enforcement resources to stop the car.
The driver is likely to be annoyed, of course, but he really has no

right to complain that his Fourth Amendment rights have been violated by a police officer doing exactly what the people are paying
him to do-enforcing the laws that they, through their representatives, have made.
C. Flaws and Omissions in Whren
Despite the correctness of its holding, the Whren opinion does

have a few weaknesses. The first of these is that, in all its discussions of how an objective justification makes a traffic stop reason16 1
able, the

only justification mentioned

is probable

cause.

62

Reasonable suspicion is not mentioned.
This was perhaps just
sloppy writing,' 6 3 because there can be no doubt under the whole
line of vehicle stop cases that a stop is justified if the officer has a
reasonable articulable suspicion short of probable cause." Any
suggestion that the Court meant to overturn all these cases sub silentio is absurd. Nevertheless the suggestion has already been made. 165
160. The petitioners, for example, used the word "arbitrary" twenty-three times
in their brief and ten times in their reply brief without attempting a definition. See
Petitioners' Brief passim; Petitioners' Reply Brief passim, Whren v. United States,
116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No. 95-5841).
161. The Court states its conclusion as, "there is no realistic alternative to the
traditional common-law rule that probable cause justifies a search and seizure."
Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. at 1777.
162. See id. passim.
163. The omission may have been suggested by James A. Feldman, Assistant to
the Solicitor General, who argued the case for the United States. At oral argument
he repeatedly spoke of probable cause without mentioning reasonable suspicion.
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 29-51, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769
(1996) (No. 95-5841). In contrast, the government's brief argued that either probable cause or reasonable suspicion justifies a traffic stop. See Respondent's Brief at
13, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No. 95-5841).
164. See cases cited supra notes 5, 7-8.
165. See United States v. Phillips, No. 96-10006-01, 1996 WL 432377, at *4 n.2 (D.
Kan. July 12, 1996) (stating Whren may require probable cause for a traffic stop, but
probably does not); Robert M. Pitler, Independent State Search and Seizure Constitutionalism: The New York State Court of Appeals' Quest for PrincipledDecisionmak-
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One would hope that this mistake will not result in the erroneous
suppression of evidence, but such a result would not be surprising.
Much time and money will probably be wasted on pointless appeals
before the muddied waters run clear again.
The second shortcoming is that the opinion barely acknowledges
that pretextual stops present a problem, though not one which implicates the Fourth Amendment. Although pretextual stops may
sometimes be an efficient use of law enforcement resources, they
are still a problem-or, perhaps, part of a larger problem. When the
traffic laws sweep so broadly that practically every driver can be
stopped on any given day, and when the majority of citizens are subject to physical seizure by the police, more or less at the whim of
every officer, something is wrong. This is especially true in those
states where even minor traffic violations can result in a full custodial arrest, often at the discretion of the officer. It seems fundamentally inconsistent with our notions of constitutional liberty that the
state should have so much power over the individuaL The problem
is especially acute because this power is often used to target racial
minorities.16 6 Further proof of the problem, if not the solution,

comes from the many judicial opinions adopting the "would have"
test or some other method of ferreting out pretextual police conduct. The judges of three federal courts of appeal and a number of
state appellate courts cannot credibly be painted as a band of deluded radical civil libertarians; the problem that they saw is real. In
short, when the police have this much authority, it can and will be
abused.
The real problem is not that the great power of the police may be
used pretextually, but that the police have so much power at all. 167
Because the Supreme Court hardly recognized the problem, however, it did almost nothing to suggest a solution once it rejected the
incorrect answer of the "would have" test. The only suggestions the
Court made were a plain statement, without elaboration or citation
to authority, that "the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection
Clause, not the Fourth Amendment,"'" and a vague suggestion that
the proper remedy for an overly broad traffic code lies with the
ing, 62 BROOK. L. Rnv. 1,290 n.1116 (1996) (Whren "implies" that probable cause is
required for a traffic stop).
166. See Petitioners' Brief at 22-28, Whren v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1769
(1996) (No. 95-5841). See also, eg., David Rudovsky, The Impact of the War on
Drugs on ProceduralFairnessand RacialEquality, 1994 U. CHL LEGAL F.237; Randall S. Susskind, Note, Race; Reasonable ArticulableSuspicion, and Seizure, 31 Am.
Cium. L. REv. 327 (1994).
167. See Butterfoss, supra note 130, at 54 ("[T]he best solution to the problem of
unbridled discretion to arrest citizens for minor offenses is a reexamination of that
authority rather than a case-by-case pretext doctrine aimed at legal pretexts ...
168. Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. at 1774.
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political branches, not the courts. 6 9 This restraint is probably a

good thing, and it is best that the Court confine itself to the precise
issue before it. The failure to acknowledge the pretext problem is
thus more of a rightful omission than a weakness, but the problem
remains.' 7 0

D. Potential Solutions to the Problem of Pretextual Stops
A number of solutions are possible,' 7' though each is either incomplete in scope or unlikely to succeed. 72 A partial answer sug-

gested by the Court is that the Equal Protection Clause offers a
remedy for discriminatory police conduct."

This is certainly cor-

rect in theory, but without exploring an issue beyond the scope of
169. See id,at 1777.
170. In stating that the pretext problem remains after the rejection of the "would
have" test, this Note assumes that that test has no continued viability as a matter of
state constitutional law. Shepardizing in mid-January 1997 reveals that no state
court has yet rejected the holding of Whren, while many have followed it. It is possible in theory, of course, that a state supreme court could be so opposed to pretextual
stops that it would find them to violate its state constitution's search and seizure
provision. This is extremely unlikely, however, given the legal and logical shortcomings of the "would have" test, and the traditional deference of most state courts to
the U.S. Supreme Court.
In Maine, for example, the Law Court has declared that in interpreting the state
constitution "we write on a clean slate ... [and] reject any straitjacket approach by
which we would automatically adopt the federal construction of the fourth amendment ban of 'unreasonable searches and seizures' as the meaning of the nearly identical provision of the Maine Constitution." State v. Bouchles, 457 A.2d 798, 801-02
(Me. 1983). Yet the Law Court has never found the Maine Constitution to extend
greater protection than the Fourth Amendment; to do so, the court would have to
get over the initial hurdle that it has never adopted a state exclusionary rule.
Bouchles itself, despite its bold language of state constitutional independence, is an
example of the court reversing previous holdings in order to bring itself in line with
developing U.S. Supreme Court search and seizure precedent. See id. at 800-02.
Considering the weak reasoning of Izzo and Haskell, see supra notes 23-30, 148-51
and accompanying text, it seems a sure bet that this deference will be repeated when
the Law Court revisits the pretextual stop issue.
171. See Gama v. State, 920 P.2d 1010, 1013 & n.3 (Nev. 1996) (recognizing that
Whren correctly overrules previous Nevada cases adopting the "would have" test,
and declining to re-adopt it under the state constitution, but insisting that pretextual
stops are a problem which must be remedied by other constitutional provisions or
the state legislature).
172. One interesting solution so unlikely to succeed that it is not discussed in the
main text is offered by Professor Barbara Salken. See Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrantof the Twentieth Century? A FourthAmendment Solution to Unchecked
Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 TEMP. L. REv. 221 (1989). Professor
Salken suggests that if the offense is insignificant enough, like a minor traffic violation, courts should consider a warrantless arrest unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. Her basic argument, which makes sense in an abstract way, is that it is
unreasonable to allow a seizure so far out of proportion to the seriousness of the
offense. The chances of this idea catching on with the present Supreme Court, however, would seem to be on the low end of the scale between slim and none.
173. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. at 1774.
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this Note, it has two obvious problems in practice. The first is procedural: The Supreme Court has never approved a remedy for an
Equal Protection violation which has any direct impact on a criminal
trial. In its last term, the Court set a high hurdle for defendants
seeking discovery on the basis of allegedly racially discriminatory
prosecution, without deciding what the result would be if a defendant could prove such discrimination. 74 The Court has never ordered the suppression of evidence obtained through racially
motivated law enforcement. The only sure remedy for an Equal
Protection violation, then, is a section 1983 action for damages or
injunctive relief. 75 If Whren and Brown could prove that the Pathfinder was stopped because they were black, the best they could
hope for under current law would be to have a damage award waiting for them when they finish their fourteen years in prison. The
second problem is evidentiary: The difficulties of proving discrimination1 76are likely to be insurmountable in the great majority of
cases.

The primary solutions to the pretext problem, however, must
come not from asking courts to limit the expansive powers given to
police but from recourse to the legislative bodies that granted those
powers. In short, law enforcement officers have so much power to
intrude upon the liberty of citizens only because legislatures have
passed so many laws for them to enforce. To some degree this is
inevitable-the widespread use of the automobile and other features of modem life make a large amount of regulation necessarybut certainly our solons could be more mindful of the effect of their
enactments on personal liberty than they are at present.
Thus states should consider reforming their traffic codes so that
violations which justify traffic stops become rarer. Speed limits
should be made more realistic; vague offenses (such as the driving at
"unreasonable speed" for which the petitioners were stopped)
should be defined with greater specificity or eliminated; and the
temptation to fill the state's coffers by turning traffic policemen into
tax collectors should be resisted. These suggestions would all serve
to reduce the number of pretextual stops by reducing the frequency
174. See United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. C. 1480, 1484 n.2 (1996) ("We have
never determined whether dismissal of the indictment, or some other sanction, is the
proper remedy if a court determines that a defendant has been the victim of prosecution on the basis of his race.").
175. See supra note 117.
176. The standard for proving discriminatory policing would likely be the same as
that for proving discriminatory prosecution: "The claimant must demonstrate that
the ... prosecutorial policy 'had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by
a discriminatory purpose.' To establish a discriminatory effect in a race case, the
claimant must show that similarly situated individuals of a different race were not
prosecuted." United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1487 (quoting Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)) (citations omitted). The difficulty of making such a showing in a traffic-stop case can easily be imagined.
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with which officers have probable cause to stop motorists. In addition, traffic codes should be reformed in all states, as they have been
in many, 177 to remove the discretion to make a full custodial arrest,
with incident body search, and impoundment and inventory search
of the car, for minor traffic infractions. This too would limit the
temptation to make pretextual stops because the chances of discovering incriminating evidence would be much reduced; it would also
make the intrusiveness of the seizure more commensurate with the
magnitude of the violation. Finally, it should be recognized that the
majority of pretextual stops are made in the hope of finding drugs.
If by some bizarre chance a legislative body in this country were
ever to engage in a rational debate over the necessity, purpose, and
effect of the drug laws, the fact that those laws are the driving force
behind the problem of pretextual stops should be considered.
V.

CONCLUSION

Whren v. United States provided the Supreme Court's answer to
the long-running debate over the problem of pretextual stops: that
it is not a Fourth Amendment problem. As this Note has demonstrated, that answer was correct. The "would have" test for pretextual stops advocated by petitioners Whren and Brown, and adopted
by a number of lower courts, was incompatible with the Supreme
Court's consistent teaching that subjective intent is irrelevant to the
question of whether a seizure is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. In addition, the "would have" test had a number of
other flaws, not the least of which was its proven unworkability. But
this Note has also argued that pretextual stops remain a problem,
albeit not a Fourth Amendment one. When police are granted the
authority to stop-that is, seize-virtually every motorist, such authority can and will be abused. Legislatures should limit that authority, remembering that alongside their laudable goals of a society
that is free of crime, drugs, and traffic accidents should be the more
noble goal of a society that is free.
Brian J. O'Donnell

177. Maine's new traffic code, for example, specifically provides that a traffic infraction is not a crime and that an officer stopping a motorist for a traffic violation
may issue a summons but may not make an arrest. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A,
§§ 103, 105 (West 1996).

